The Squirrels
Tuesday, 18 August 2026
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Philippines. Vietnam. Indonesia. India Is Building a Missile Arc Around the South China Sea.

By Squirrels·

Three Deals. Three Countries. One Sea.

On July 7, 2026, India and Indonesia signed a defence package worth over $600 million — including BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles and Astra Mk-1 beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles. The deal also includes the joint development of Sabang Port, located at the northern tip of Sumatra, overlooking the Strait of Malacca — barely 160 kilometres from India's upcoming Great Nicobar transhipment port.

Indonesia is the third Indo-Pacific nation to acquire BrahMos. The sequence:

Country

Year

Deal Value

Status

Philippines

2022

$375 million

Delivered 2024

Vietnam

May 2026

~$700 million

Signed

Indonesia

July 2026

$600+ million

Signed

Combined value: over $1.7 billion in missile sales to three countries that share one thing in common — each has territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea.

The same day Modi departed for his three-nation tour (Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand), China tested a nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missile in the Pacific — only its third such publicly known test since 1949.

The timing was not coincidental on either side.


Why BrahMos Is the Weapon Everyone Wants

The BrahMos — jointly developed by India's DRDO and Russia's NPO Mashinostroyenia — is among the world's fastest operational cruise missiles.

Speed: Mach 2.8–3 (nearly three times the speed of sound). This makes it extremely difficult to intercept — most naval defence systems are designed to counter subsonic or low-supersonic missiles.

Range: Extended-range variants exceed 400 kilometres — sufficient to deny access to maritime zones from coastal batteries.

Versatility: Can be launched from land, sea, air, and submarine platforms.

The only comparable missile is China's YJ-12, according to IISS senior fellow Douglas Barrie. BrahMos is, in the words of SIPRI researcher Siemon Wezeman, "one of the largest and fastest available on the market just now."

The anti-ship version is what South China Sea nations are buying. For countries with limited naval forces facing a Chinese navy that has more warships than any other, land-based anti-ship missiles offer a cost-effective deterrence strategy. You don't need a fleet to deny access to your waters. You need missiles that can sink the fleet attempting it.

This is the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) doctrine — and BrahMos is now its primary commercial instrument in Southeast Asia.

BrahMos | Missile Threat

The Missile Arc: What It Looks Like on a Map

Plot the three BrahMos buyers on a map of the South China Sea:

Philippines — eastern shore. BrahMos batteries deployed to defend territorial waters around the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal. Already exercised alongside US Typhon and NMESIS systems during Balikatan 2026.

Vietnam — western shore. Will complement existing Russian Bastion-P coastal defence systems and fortified island outposts. Vietnam has the most extensive island infrastructure of any South China Sea claimant after China.

Indonesia — southern approach. Natuna Islands — the area where Indonesian and Chinese maritime claims overlap — are the likely deployment zone.

Together, the three countries form a triangle of missile-armed states capable of covering nearly the entire South China Sea from shore-based platforms.

As one analyst described it: "China's naval dominance will increasingly be challenged not by rival fleets, but by dispersed missile networks."


Sabang Port: The Deal That Matters More Than the Missiles

The most consequential agreement in the India-Indonesia package may not be the BrahMos sale. It may be the joint development of Sabang Port.

Sabang sits at the northern tip of Sumatra, directly overlooking the Strait of Malacca — the chokepoint through which approximately 25% of global maritime trade transits. The port is a deep-water facility capable of accommodating all classes of naval vessels, including submarines.

It is located 160 km from India's upcoming Great Nicobar transhipment port and military facility.

Together, Sabang and Great Nicobar would give India and Indonesia effective monitoring and access-control positions on both sides of the Malacca Strait's northern entrance — the gateway between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.

For China, which depends on the Malacca Strait for 80%+ of its oil imports, the India-Indonesia Sabang agreement represents a strategic development more consequential than any missile sale.

India Sabang Port deal with Indonesia near Nicobar to counter China - India  Today

Why Now? The US Vacuum

The acceleration of India's defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia is driven by a specific geopolitical shift: the perception that the United States is deprioritising the Indo-Pacific.

As documented in our Islamabad MoU analysis, the USINDPACOM was renamed USPACOM — removing India from the command's title and signalling a strategic downgrade. The US National Security Strategy 2025 barely mentioned Southeast Asia. American missile and naval assets were redeployed from the Pacific to West Asia during the Iran war.

Southeast Asian nations are drawing the obvious conclusion: US security guarantees in the Indo-Pacific are not as reliable as they were. The response: diversify defence partnerships. Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines are buying BrahMos not because India is replacing the US — it cannot — but because they need deterrence capability that doesn't depend on American presence.

India's Operation Sindoor in April 2025 served as an unintentional marketing event. The demonstrated use of Indian-origin weapons in a real military operation — with international observers watching — boosted BrahMos's credibility as a combat-proven system.


The Numbers That Show How Far India Has to Go

The missile sales are strategically significant. The financial scale, however, remains modest.

India's total defence exports in FY 2025–26: ₹384 billion ($4 billion). This is approximately 1% of the United States' $331 billion in annual arms sales.

India is not among the world's top 25 arms exporters, according to SIPRI's 2021–2025 data. China ranks 5th. South Korea ranks 9th.

India is, however, the world's 5th largest military spender and 2nd largest arms importer — purchasing over 8% of global arms imports.

The aspiration — to move from importer to exporter, from buyer to supplier — is the structural transformation India's defence policy has been pursuing since at least 2014. The BrahMos sales are the most visible evidence that this transformation is underway. But the gap between $4 billion in exports and $331 billion (the US benchmark) is a reminder that India's defence-industrial base is at the beginning of a very long journey.


Frequently Asked Questions

Which countries has India sold BrahMos missiles to?

Three Indo-Pacific nations: the Philippines (2022, $375M, delivered 2024), Vietnam (signed May 2026, ~$700M), and Indonesia (signed July 2026, $600M+).

What is BrahMos?

A supersonic cruise missile jointly developed by India's DRDO and Russia's NPO Mashinostroyenia. It travels at Mach 2.8–3, has a range exceeding 400 km, and can be launched from land, sea, air, and submarine platforms. Its anti-ship variant is in highest demand.

What is the Sabang Port agreement?

India and Indonesia will jointly develop Sabang Port at the northern tip of Sumatra — 160 km from India's Great Nicobar facility. Together, the two ports would give India and Indonesia positions on both sides of the Strait of Malacca's northern entrance.

How large are India's defence exports?

₹384 billion ($4 billion) in FY26 — approximately 1% of US arms exports. India is not in the top 25 global arms exporters but is the 5th largest military spender and 2nd largest importer.


The Bottom Line

India is doing something it has never done before at this scale: selling strategic weapons to countries that share a common security concern — and using those sales to build a network of partnerships that serves India's own geopolitical interests.

The BrahMos arc around the South China Sea — Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia — is not a formal military alliance. It is a commercial-strategic relationship built on shared threat perception, proven weapon systems, and the declining confidence in American security guarantees.

The $1.7 billion in combined missile deals is modest by global standards. But the strategic geometry — three missile-armed nations covering the South China Sea from three directions, plus an Indian-Indonesian port partnership at the Malacca Strait — represents a structural change in Indo-Pacific security architecture that no dollar figure fully captures.

India has been called a rising power for two decades. The BrahMos sales are the first sustained evidence that the rise has a military-industrial dimension — not just an economic one.