Bloomberg report on submarine deal with Russia dismissed, but India values such deals

The government on Thursday denied that India had signed a fresh submarine agreement with Russia, countering a Bloomberg report that said New Delhi had “clinched a $2 billion Russia submarine deal” ahead of President Vladimir Putin’s visit. In a post tagged #PIBFactCheck, officials said the claim was misleading, adding that the arrangement referred to in the report was part of an existing lease contract concluded in March 2019. Delivery under that contract, delayed for several years, is now scheduled for 2028.

The clarification follows a pattern in which Bloomberg reports on India’s defence or economic decisions have been dismissed by the government as inaccurate or misleading. Officials again stressed that no additional agreement had been negotiated in recent weeks, and that the 2019 framework remained the operative document.

Long-running lease programme, nuclear submarine training role

India had earlier agreed to lease a nuclear-powered attack submarine from Russia under the 2019 contract after prolonged negotiations on cost, timelines and configuration. Sources cited by Bloomberg said price discussions had stalled on several occasions before both sides settled the terms. Indian officials visited a Russian shipyard in November to review progress at the production facility.

The submarine is expected to join the Indian Navy on a 10-year lease for training and familiarisation, not active deployment. Its role is to prepare crews, refine operational procedures and deepen experience as India advances work on its own nuclear-powered attack submarine line. India returned an earlier Russian nuclear submarine after a 10-year lease ended in 2021, with that platform having provided exposure to extended submerged operations, nuclear propulsion behaviour and deep-sea navigation.

India’s submarine fleet, capability expansion needs

India’s submarine arm is operating with a dwindling set of platforms despite the Navy repeatedly stressing the need for force expansion. The fleet currently relies on the ageing Sindhughosh-class (Kilo-class) submarines, the Shishumar-class (U-209) boats and a handful of Scorpène-class vessels built under Project 75 at Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders. Together, they give India a modest undersea capability but fall far short of the Navy’s stated requirement of at least twenty-four attack submarines.

The gap is more striking when compared with the rapid modernisation of China’s undersea fleet, which now includes advanced nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) and ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). Pakistan, with Chinese help, is also in the process of acquiring Hangor-class submarines equipped with Air Independent Propulsion, which will complicate India’s coastal defence and sea-denial missions.

While India has plans for Project 75I, intended to deliver a new line of stealthier, more capable conventional submarines, the project has faced chronic delays due to disagreements over technology transfer, pricing and liability clauses. The Navy’s aspiration to field indigenous SSNs has also been approved in principle, but these platforms will take years before entering production.

Key takeaways

• India requires at least twenty-four attack submarines; current numbers remain well below this threshold
• China’s expanding SSN and SSBN fleet, and Pakistan’s upcoming Hangor-class boats, are shifting the regional balance
• Delays in Project 75I and the long gestation period for indigenous SSNs are widening the capability gap
• The Navy’s operational plans rely on faster induction cycles and more transparent decision-making on platform procurement

Indo-Russian defence ties, pressures in global market

India’s long-standing defence partnership with Russia faces sustained pressure from shifting geopolitics, sanctions regimes and competing global suppliers. For decades, Russian platforms formed the backbone of India’s military capabilities — from the Su-30MKI fleet to the T-90 tanks, S-400 air defence systems and the Chakra lease arrangements for nuclear submarines.

However, Moscow’s ongoing war in Ukraine has tightened Western sanctions, disrupted Russia’s supply chains and reduced its capacity to deliver spares, upgrades and new systems on schedule. With Russia diverting production capacity to its own battlefield needs, Indian orders have increasingly slipped, forcing the Services to look at alternative global vendors, including France, Israel and the United States.

At the same time, Russian equipment has become less competitive in a global market dominated by modular systems, digital avionics, network-centric warfare capabilities and robust after-sales support. While India still values strategic autonomy and does not wish to abandon Moscow, the structural pressures on the Russian economy mean that New Delhi must diversify procurement without undermining past commitments.

This shift is visible in India’s preference for French submarines, American maritime aircraft, Israeli UAVs and joint ventures such as the BrahMos with Russia, transitioning from licensed production towards more indigenous content.

Key takeaways

• Sanctions, supply-chain constraints and Russia’s own war needs are delaying deliveries to India
• Global competition has reduced the relative attractiveness of Russian platforms
• India is increasing defence diversification without severing long-standing ties with Moscow
• The shift towards Western suppliers reflects operational needs, interoperability goals and technology-transfer expectations

Regional competition, strategic context

Interest in nuclear-powered submarines has risen across the Indo-Pacific. Australia is advancing its AUKUS programme, while South Korea is working with the US on its ambitions for nuclear-powered capabilities. Only a handful of countries currently operate such submarines, a factor that further elevates their strategic value.

India’s maritime focus has sharpened as rival navies increase their presence in the region. Extended patrol ability, rapid redeployment across large distances, and discreet tracking of adversary vessels are areas where nuclear-powered attack submarines are critical. The lease arrangement with Russia is designed to sustain training pipelines and operational familiarity as indigenous projects progress.

Policy silence on delivery schedule

The Ministry of External Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and their Russian counterparts have not issued any statement on the updated delivery timeline, beyond confirming that the project remains within the original 2019 framework. Negotiations on technical support and logistical arrangements continue alongside India’s broader effort to balance long-standing strategic partnerships with a more competitive international defence market.