Both BJP, Congress wrong about Vandemataram

The winter session debate on Vandemataram marked the song’s 150th anniversary but quickly became a partisan battle. Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha took up discussions meant to commemorate the national song, yet the exchanges became a political duel between the BJP and Congress.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Home Minister Amit Shah framed the song as a “maha mantra” of cultural nationalism that guided the freedom struggle. Modi went further, alleging that Congress in 1937 “removed important stanzas” to appease the Muslim League, a move he claimed planted “seeds of partition”. Shah insisted the full song retained the same moral authority it held during anti-colonial resistance.

While historian Ravi Bhatt clarified what history says about the issue in the talk show (YouTube video) above, The Squirrels ran its own fact-check as under:

Opposition parties responded by questioning the debate’s intent. AIMIM MP Asaduddin Owaisi said no government could compel citizens, particularly Muslims, to recite the song. Congress MPs defended the long-standing practice of singing only the first two stanzas, arguing the decision was meant to accommodate non-Hindu sentiments and maintain unity during the struggle for Independence. Priyanka Gandhi Vadra accused the BJP of using the song as an electoral weapon, especially with the West Bengal polls approaching.

The discussion produced no legislative outcome but reinforced deep ideological divides over nationalism, history, and cultural symbolism in modern India.

BJP's claim: 1937 truncation

BJP leaders repeatedly argued that the Congress “cut” the song under pressure from Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League. This narrative does not match historical records.

Vandemataram, composed by Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay in *Anandamath* (1882), became a patriotic anthem during the Swadeshi movement. Yet objections to some verses emerged decades before Partition. Muslim leaders, including Maulana Mohamed Ali, and even initially Rabindranath Tagore, objected to later stanzas due to goddess imagery and depictions drawn from *Anandamath*, where “enemies” resemble Muslim rulers. These objections were public by the 1920s and 1930s.

The key decision came in October 1937. The Congress Working Committee, headed by Acharya Kripalani and including Jawaharlal Nehru, Rajendra Prasad, Subhas Chandra Bose, and Maulana Azad, set up a committee to evaluate the issue. After deliberation, the CWC resolved that only the first two stanzas—patriotic and free from devotional imagery—would be used in Congress events. This was taken ten years before Independence, long before Nehru held government office. It was an organisational choice to prevent communal polarisation at a moment when the Muslim League was gaining influence after provincial elections.

There is no evidence that Jinnah exerted fresh pressure after 1947. By the time the Constituent Assembly addressed the national symbols, the League had ceased functioning within India. BJP’s claim collapses on chronology.

Opposition's claim: Secular harmony

Congress MPs emphasised that the 1937 decision and post-Independence adoption were inclusive acts. Their defence aligns with historical precedent but glosses over its own political motivations.

At the 1937 Lucknow session, Jinnah denounced the song as “polytheistic”, and the Muslim League called for a boycott. Congress leaders wanted Muslims to remain within the national movement at a time of rising communal friction. The decision to limit Vandemataram to two stanzas was partly a response to these tensions.

Priyanka Gandhi Vadra and Jairam Ramesh invoked Tagore’s views. Tagore did sing Vandemataram at the 1896 Congress session, but that rendition was selective. Later, he suggested using only the first verses to avoid alienating any section of society. His counsel was influential but not singular; objections had already surfaced widely.

Nehru’s 1937 letter to Bose, quoted selectively by Modi, criticised “communalist” objections but also accepted the need for harmony. Congress MPs used the fuller letter to challenge the Prime Minister’s interpretation, showing Nehru did not concede to any League veto. The decision remained a CWC judgement, not an imposition.

Congress leaders were correct that the Constituent Assembly’s final adoption on 24 January 1950, announced by Rajendra Prasad, was unanimous and uncontested. “Equal status” to Vandemataram acknowledged its freedom struggle legacy while maintaining a secular framework. This was not a reaction to any active League position; the party no longer existed in India. It was, instead, a symbolic rejection of earlier communal vetoes from all sides, including the League and Hindu Mahasabha.

Historical reality in the adoption of songs

The truncated version used since 1950 mirrors the 1937 CWC resolution. Independent India continued an established practice rather than creating a new compromise. Court rulings later reaffirmed that no citizen can be compelled to sing even the two sanctioned stanzas.

The Indian National Congress’s portrayal of the decision as a secular, collective act is broadly accurate, although it softens the political context: the party needed Muslim support during a period of intense polarisation. BJP’s version, however, is historically faulty. The alleged “abridgement under Jinnah’s pressure” did not occur; neither the interim government nor the post-Independence leadership revisited or altered the 1937 decision.

The song’s evolution reflects India’s long struggle to balance cultural pride with religious diversity. Vandemataram’s status emerged from internal debate, not external coercion. Misrepresentation by either side obscures the actual history.

Political row over national identity

The winter session clash revealed how national symbols become instruments of contest. BJP framed the debate as a matter of cultural revival and historical correction. Congress framed it as a defence of secular tradition against political opportunism. Both framed portions of history selectively.

The song remains a powerful emblem of the freedom struggle, yet its place in public life is shaped by compromise, not coercion. India's leadership—from Kripalani to Nehru, Bose, Prasad, and later governments—accepted a version that honoured resistance while respecting diversity.

The current debate, driven more by electoral strategy than historical accuracy, risks turning a unifying symbol into another arena for polarisation. The record shows no betrayal of nationalism, no capitulation to external demands, but a deliberate attempt by India’s early leadership to hold together a plural society during times of profound division.